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Tradition has assigned to the President the task of settling disputes
among departments and non-independent agencies of the executive
branch.' The complex regulatory duties that Congress gives to the
executive branch create an inexhaustible source of legal conflicts2
among the agencies;3 the need for resolution by some external or
superior authority is unquestionable. Yet the current practice of in-
formal resolution of inter-agency legal disputes within the executive
branch occasionally compromises the public interest.
This Note suggests that executive-branch departments and agen-
cies should have an opportunity to litigate disputes about congres-
1. See Exec. Order No. 12,146, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,657 (1979) (directing intra-branch
resolution of legal disputes among executive agencies). Regular adherence to the custom
of resolving inter-agency legal conflicts within the executive branch, embodied in Exec.
Order No. 12,146, has meant that questions about the justiciability of such disputes in
federal court have seldom been forced on the present Administration. Interview with
Leon Ulman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Justice
Department, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 17, 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
Yet, in the only recent legal dispute among federal parties in which the agencies actually
questioned whether they might litigate the issue rather than submit it to intra-branch
arbitration, the Justice Department concluded that an inter-agency lawsuit was impos-
sible. See Memorandum Opinion for the Acting Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division:
Proposed Tax Assessment Against the United States Postal Service, I OPINIONS OF THE
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 79 (L. Ulman
ed. 1980) (Opinion No. 77-22, dated Apr. 22, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ,OLC 77-22].
References in this Note to "executive-branch" agencies, as opposed to "independent"
agencies, rely on the traditional distinction between authorities whose leadership serves
at the President's pleasure and those whose heads enjoy significantly independent tenure.
See 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 2:7, at 85 (2d ed. 1978) (power of removal
a "meaningful" test of agency status); cf. Exec. Order No. 12,146, § 1-4, 44 Fed. Reg.
42,657 (1979) (rule to govern procedures for resolution of inter-agency disputes distinguish-
ing between "agencies whose heads serve at the pleasure of the President" and other
authorities).
Comprehensive distinctions between the so-called independent agencies and the adminis-
trative bodies that are responsible to the President are elusive. See K. DAvis, supra, at
82-87 (summarizing various methods of classification). One attribute of the major inde-
pendent agencies is a capacity to litigate against the Justice Department. See note 4
infra (cases establishing standing of independent agencies). Insofar as this Note's argu-
ment recommends that the executive-branch agencies should also possess a capacity to
litigate, it would diminish the need for problematic distinctions among the federal
regulatory authorities.
2. Conflicts concerning regulatory policy and other nonlegal issues are not within
the scope of this Note. See Note, Delegation and Regulatory Reform: Letting the President
Change the Rules, 89 YALE LJ. 561 (1980) (methods of resolving intra-branch policy de-
bates).
3. See notes 6, 7, 8, 16, 25, 9: 82 infra (recent examples of serious inter-agency legal
conflicts).
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sional allocations of regulatory power as principal and adverse parties
in federal court. Inter-agency litigation would eliminate the practical
inadequacies of the internal settlement process, and would conform
to the constitutional and prudential limits on the federal judicial
power.
I. The Quest for Executive-Branch Unanimity
Although politically autonomous bodies like the Interstate Com-
merce Commission have long been able to oppose the Justice Depart-
ment in federal court,4 the cabinet-level departments and non-inde-
pendent agencies have been assumed to have no such capacity to
litigate.5 Instead, the executive branch has developed informal ar-
bitration processes to resolve serious inter-agency legal disputes gen-
erated by the statutory delegation of authority to the agencies. Even
though an internal settlement concludes the dispute among the Presi-
dent's officers, that solution is often later subjected to judicial review
at the suit of private parties. Such a pattern introduces substantial
delays and uncertainties into the federal administrative process.
A. The Sources of Intra-Branch Legal Disputes
Many disputes within the executive branch turn upon the con-
struction of statutes granting regulatory power to the agencies.6 The
4. See United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949) (permitting War Department, as shipper
of freight, to sue Commission to set aside reparations order); cf. United States v. ICC, 396
U.S. 491 (1970) (Court deciding merits of Justice Department's attack on Commission's ap-
proval of railroad merger without questioning jurisdiction); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343
U.S. 470, 482 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting "recent instances in which part of
the government appears before us fighting another part .. ") But see United States v.
Easement & Right of Way, 204 F. Supp. 837, 839 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (denying motion of
Tennessee Valley Authority to join Farmers Home Administration, a division of Agri-
culture Department, as defendant in condemnation suit, "both [agencies] being the
United States. ... ); OLC 77-22, supra note 1, at 82-83 (Justice Department, although
deeming Postal Service an independent agency, concluding the latter's dispute with Inter-
nal Revenue Service to be non-justiciable). One commentary has assumed the capacity of
"one federal agency to sue another," see Comment, Municipal Corporation Standing to
Sue the State: Rogers v. Brockette, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 586, 593 n.51 (1980), but its con-
clusion appears based only upon cases involving independent agencies. Id.
5. See note I supra (current Administration's presumption that inter-agency legal
disputes cannot be litigated).
6. Occasionally, inter-agency legal disputes depend not upon language in statutes but
upon construction of other instruments. Thus, in a dispute culminating in Pueblo of Taos
v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 1979), the Agriculture and Interior Departments both
possessed colorable claims, based on nineteenth-century deeds and surveys, to administer a
tract of western land. The competing agencies obtained an opinion from the Attorney
General that resolved the dispute by allotting management duties to an Agriculture De-
partment agency, id. at 362; subsequently, private parties successfully challenged the At-
torney General's opinion in Pueblo of Taos.
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most serious problems of statutory interpretation typically assume
two forms. Different statutes sometimes appear to assign exclusive
regulatory power over a particular subject-matter to separate agencies. 7
In other cases, statutes seem to grant one agency the power to super-
vise another agency's regulation of private-sector activities.8 Uncer-
tainty about congressional intent in such matters is inevitable in
the complex legislation that creates the agencies and establishes their
regulatory programs.9
When neither agency will give up its claim to exclusive regulatory
authority, or when the two agencies cannot agree on whether one
agency is accountable to the other, uncertainty about the statutes'
7. An example is the dispute summarized in California v. Kleppe, 604 F.2d 1187 (9th
Cir. 1979). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) differed with the view of the
Interior Department that an amendment to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1334(a)(8) (Supp. II 1978), transferred exclusive power to promulgate federal
air-emission control regulations from EPA to the Interior Secretary. The Justice De-
partment agreed with EPA, see note 16 infra, and unsuccessfully argued EPA's position
in the challenge to EPA authority in the California v. Kleppe suit commenced by state
and industry parties.
8. A conflict between the Commerce and Interior Departments concerning Interior's
supervision of offshore oil exploration pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (OCSLA) is typical of such disputes.
Commerce asserted that Interior's leasing and "preleasing" activities affecting the coastal
zone were subject to controls in the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-
1464 (1976 & Supp. I 1978) (CZMA). Interior disagreed with Commerce's interpretations
of OCSLA and CZMA. The two departments sought intra-branch arbitration of their
dispute, and the Justice Department eventually issued an opinion letter accepting with
some qualifications Commerce's view of the statutes that subordinated certain OCSLA
functions to CZMA requirements. As a result, Interior's "preleasing" activities that directly
affect the coastal zone must conform to state coastal management programs, pursuant to
16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1976 9- Supp. II 1978) (government activities "directly affecting the
coastal zone" to be "consistent" with Commerce-approved state control plans). See Letter
from Leon Ulman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to C.L. Haslam, Commerce De-
partment, and Leo M. Krulitz, Interior Department (Apr. 20, 1979) (rendering Justice
Department opinion) (copy on file with Yale Law Journal).
9. Current doctrine holds that, as a principle of statutory construction, contradictory
assignments of regulatory jurisdiction are impossible. See, e.g., California v. Kleppe, 604
F.2d 1187, 1199 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[N]o jurisdictional conflict can arise" because Congress
cannot have intended that "the jurisdictional grants [to EPA and Interior] . . . could
stand together."); Get Oil Outl Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 586 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1978)
(where acts have potential for conflict, court's "obligation [is] to so construe federal
statutes ... that they are consistent with each other," in order to vindicate congressional
intent).
Foreclosure of inter-agency legal disputes through more precise drafting of regulatory
statutes could never be complete. As in the Interior Department-Commerce Department
conflict, see note 8 supra, it may be difficult for Congress to anticipate questions about
statutory authority arising from details of agency procedures promulgated after passage
of the statute. This is particularly true when more than one agency has general regulatory
duties in the area that the statute addresses. Statutory attempts to consolidate regulatory
power in a single executive-branch authority by amendments transferring that power
from other agencies appear to be especially troublesome. See note 30 infra (agency un-
certainty concerning possible transfers of function under Department of Energy Organi-
zation Act).
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requirements will lead to conflict. The questions raised in such dis-
putes are essentially jurisdictional.10 The agencies do not clash on
proper interpretation of the substantive guidelines Congress has es-
tablished for use by some agency, but instead disagree on the threshold
question of which agency has authority to act at all, or of whether
one agency must supervise another's regulation.
B. The Two-Step Resolution Process
When a dispute within the executive branch is identified as legal
in nature," the Justice Department may intervene, at the request
of the White House,' 2 by formulating an opinion' 3 to settle the con-
flict.' 4 The contending agencies are expected to adopt the Justice De-
10. This Note deals with the resolution of these inter-agency disputes over jurisdiction.
The proposal for litigation of inter-agency disputes thus does not extend to all disagree-
ments within the executive branch concerning the interpretation of statutes or otherwise
subject to classification as questions of law. The Interior Department-Commerce Depart-
ment dispute, see note 8 supra, the Interior Department-EPA dispute, see note 7 supra,
and the Interior Department-Agriculture Department dispute, see note 6 supra, are all
examples of "jurisdictional" disputes. Because all the agencies agree on which executive-
branch authorities have the power to promulgate rules, however, the dispute concerning
implementation of civil rights legislation, see note 27 infra, is not a dispute over juris-
diction; there, the agencies cannot agree on substantive legal requirements for a particular
rule proposed by the agency conceded to have subject-matter jurisdiction.
11. Exec. Order 12,146, §§ 1-401 to -402, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,657 (1979), makes a provision
for resolution of "Interagency Legal Disputes," but does not define "legal disputes" be-
yond a specific inclusion of "question[s] of which [agency] has jurisdiction to administer
a particular program or to regulate a particular activity." Id. § 1-401. The Justice De-
partment, however, will not arbitrate nonlegal conflicts. Interview with Leon Ulman,
supra note 1. See also note 14 infra (limits on advice-giving function).
12. The Attorney General renders advice on "questions of law" for the President, 28
U.S.C. § 511 (1976), and for other members of the executive branch, 28 U.S.C. § 512
(1976). Exec. Order 12,146, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,657 (1979), directs executive-branch officials to
adjourn otherwise irresolvable disputes to the Attorney General.
13. Preparation of the Attorney General's opinions and other advisory statements for
the executive branch is a function of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). 28 C.F.R. § 0.25
(1979); see Ulman, Foreword to I OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL OF THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUsTICE, supra note 1, at v (summarizing history of OLC
and its predecessors). Not all inter-agency legal disputes, however, are adjourned to OLC,
and apparently some conflicts are settled by other divisions of the Justice Department. See
notes 16 & 19 infra (resolution of inter-agency conflicts in course of litigation with ex-
ternal parties).
14. The status of these disputes as "questions of law" is self-evident from judicial
decisions reviewing OLC determinations on their merits, see, e.g., Pueblo of Taos v.
Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 1979), and appears essential to OLC's function as legal
adviser to the executive branch, Interview with Leon Ulman, supra note 1; see Memoran-
dum Opinion for the General Counsel, Department of Defense: Status of Baggers as Fed-
eral Employees-Fair Labor Standards Act, 1 OPINIoNs OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supr a ndte 1, at 102, 107 (deeming "mixed
question of law and fact . . . beyond the authority of this Office"); see notes 11 & 12
supra (definition of Justice Department's advice-rendering duties).
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partment's solution to their conflict,' 5 and the Department represents
the executive branch in any subsequent judicial challenge from pri-
vate parties."6
The legal dispute thus proceeds through two stages. First, the is-
sues are argued and resolved within the executive branch.17 In the
second stage-a stage that is routinely reached today' 5-the issues are
re-examined in judicial review proceedings commenced by a private
party. Within that two-step model, the Justice Department first serves
as arbiter for the executive-branch disputants, and then acts as coun-
sel for the United States. 9
15. See Statement of Donald Elisburg, Assistant Secretary of Labor, quoted in Legal
Times of Washington, Jan. 14, 1980, at 5, col. I (concerning role of Justice Department
in resolving a dispute between Labor and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission:
"We feel the Attorney General is the government's chief lawyer and we are obligated
to abide by Justice's opinion."); Interview with Robert E. Litan, former member of
Council of Economic Advisers staff, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 17, 1979) (notes on file
with Yale Law Journal) (when external party sues agency, even federal authorities that
have disagreed with respondent tend to "close the wagon circle" around official opinion).
Though not all of OLC's advice is intended to be binding, OLC expects agencies that seek
final resolution of disputes from the Office to regard its opinions as binding. Interview
with Leon Ulman, supra note 1.
16. The Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1976), concentrates general authority for litiga-
tion, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law," in the Justice Department.
The ability to control litigation can fuse with the power to resolve intra-branch disputes.
In California v. Kleppe, 604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1979), the Justice Department's defense of
the EPA's claim of jurisdiction to regulate atmospheric conditions over the outer con-
tinental shelf amounted to a decision against an opposing claim by the Interior Depart-
ment to regulate emissions in the same airspace. Interior could play no part in the
litigation adverse to EPA's position. As one Interior Department official remarked, "Jus-
tice was representing EPA, so all we could do was sit on the sidelines and hope that EPA
lost." Interview with staff member, Interior Department, in Washington, D.C. (December
17, 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
17. OLC's solutions to inter-agency legal disputes are based on the merits of the con-
troversy, and do not involve considerations of political expediency, in which OLC has no
expertise. Interview with Leon Ulman, supra note 1.
18. Of the five major recent inter-agency legal disputes discussed here, two have al-
ready grown into litigation with external challengers. See note 7 supra (EPA-Interior
conflict on air-emission regulation); note 6 supra (Agriculture-Interior conflict on man-
agement of western tract). One has reached the stage of internal settlement too recently
to allow certain prediction of litigation, see note 8 supra (Interior-Commerce dispute con-
cerning oil exploration controls), and another appears not yet to have been resolved
within the executive branch, see note 25 infra (conflict on anti-discrimination require-
ments of public-sector contractors). The dispute between the Postal Service and the In-
ternal Revenue Service, see note 82 infra, was deemed non-justiciable by OLC, which
has proceeded to consider the merits of the controversy. Interview with Leon Ulman, supra
note I.
19. The Justice Department's counsel status can involve noteworthy powers to alter
the methods of arbitration within the executive branch. See Letter from Sanford Sagalkin,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, to John E.
Menario, Interior Department (July 13, 1979) (copy on file with Yale Law Journal);
Letter from Sanford Sagalkin to John Goldstein, Director, Endangered Species Committee,
Interior Department (July 17, 1979) (copy on file with Yale Law Journal) (discussing
resolution of inter-agency dispute by Justice Department litigation counsel).
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The change in the adversarial structure of an inter-agency jurisdic-
tional dispute as it moves from the first to the second stage of its
development does not alter the identity of the issues involved. Both
the court and the executive-branch arbiter must decide whether the
agencies have received from Congress the powers and duties they
claim.20 Moreover, problems of statutory interpretation usually arise
only after one agency begins to act in response to a particular prob-
lem.21 Intra-branch disputes thus often reach the courts without sub-
stantial change in their factual setting.22
C. The Problem of Delay and Uncertainty
The traditional two-step process for clarifying regulatory powers
and duties causes serious delays in the administrative process. Agency
heads jealously guard their regulatory domains and may feel com-
pelled to struggle in a variety of executive-branch forums with other
authorities having conflicting interests.2 3 Even when all parties agree
on the need for expedition, disputes can take years to reach the Jus-
tice Department for settlement.24 Justice Department resolution of an
inter-agency conflict can itself take as long as one year.2 5 Those time
20. The attack on an agency's regulatory jurisdiction in court is likely to be joined
with challenges to the agency action based on other grounds. See note 31 infra (compara-
tive importance of proper jurisdictional basis for agency action and consequences of
judicial finding of no jurisdiction to regulate).
21. Executive-branch agencies do not dispute ambiguities in regulatory statutes for
purposes of abstract argument, and the Justice Department is reluctant to arbitrate dis-
putes unless the contending agencies request it and can show that an authoritative decision
is essential. Interview with Robert E. Litan, supra note 15.
22. New developments in a controversy's factual setting may occur between the time
the dispute first arises among executive-branch authorities and the time when, if the two-
step resolution process ran its course, the matter would reach the courts. See pp. 1616-
19 infra (considerations of ripeness affecting inter-agency litigation).
23. The Interior Department-Commerce Department Coastal Zone dispute, see note 8
supra, for example, was carried to the Office of Management and Budget prior to ad-
journment to OLC. Interview with Teresa Hooks, former staff attorney, Office of the
Solicitor, United States Department of the Interior, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 3, 1979).
No formal rules govern referrals of disputes to OLC from other sectors of the executive
branch, apart from Exec. Order 12,146, § 1-402, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,657 (1979), which directs
that agencies that "are unable to resolve . . . a legal dispute" submit the matter to the
Attorney General.
24. The Interior Department-Commerce Department dispute, see note 8 supra, took
two years to reach OLC for arbitration. Interview with Teresa Hooks, supra note 23.
25. Interview with Leon Ulman, supra note 1. In at least one instance, a single decision
from OLC has been inadequate to conclude a dispute. A disagreement over the legally per-
missible scope of prohibitions on payment of employees' dues to discriminatory clubs by
public-sector contractors based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 led to opinions
from OLC in 1976 and again in 1977; the Civil Rights Division joined in the latter
decision. It appears that the conflict, involving the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs in the Labor Depart-
ment, remains unresolved despite Justice's efforts. See Legal Times of Washington, Jan.
14, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
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lapses in turn precede the lengthy period that an external challenge
to the final administrative action will consume; the court and the
litigants must then duplicate the effort already invested by the ex-
ecutive branch in resolving the jurisdictional uncertainty.
If a reviewing court finds that the agency given clearance to regu-
late by the executive-branch arbiter did not possess statutory au-
thority,26 the delay in implementation of Congress' plan will grow
even longer. Whether or not the court reverses the internal resolution,
the delay and duplication entailed in the entire process contribute to
the time lag in the administrative process that the courts,2 7 com-
mentators,28 and administrators2 9 themselves generally deplore.
Administrators confronted by unclear congressional guidelines may
attempt to reduce the costs of internal disputes by deciding quietly
among themselves at the beginning of a conflict which "lead" agency
will assume the power to act.30 Such a stratagem will be partially
26. In interpretation of the statutory limits on agencies' powers, there exists no effec-
tive rule of judicial deference to the executive branch's solution to the controversy. See,
e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 348-49 (1939) (rejecting formal opinion of Attorney
General); California v. Kleppe, 604 F.2d 1187, 1199 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting Justice De-
partment view of jurisdictional dispute between EPA and Interior Department); Pueblo
of Taos v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 359, 367 (D.D.C. 1979) (rejecting Justice Department so-
lution to intra-branch conflict over jurisdiction to manage western lands).
27. See, e.g., FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515, 527 (1964) (chiding Commission for "nigh in-
terminable" delay in licensing procedures); Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 206 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (although "issues are complicated," court will enforce Commission's duty to decide
them within reasonable time); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672,
690 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that problems of "delay and inefficiency" at Commission
survive both pro- and anti-activist reforms); cf. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1094-1100 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (where administrative inaction has same
effect as denial of relief, courts will intervene as if action had been taken).
28. See Freedman, Review Boards in the Administrative Process, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
546, 546 (1969) (noting criticism of administrative delays); cf. SUBCOMMrITEE ON ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., RE-
PORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (Comm. Print 1960) ("Inordinate
delay characterizes the disposition of adjudicatory proceedings before substantially all
of our regulatory agencies.")
29. See, e.g., In re American Tel. 9. Tel. Co., 28 F.C.C.2d 213, 273 (1972) (Johnson,
Comm'r, dissenting) (terming decade of delay in decisions on tariff applications "nothing
short of amazing").
30. An example is the collaboration of the Interior and Energy Departments in
promulgation of regulations to govern the rate of exploration and development of offshore
oil under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1356 (1976 & Supp. II
1978) (OCSLA). Administrators at Energy and Interior believed that the Department of
Energy Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7152(b)(3) (Supp. II 1978), might have required
Energy to promulgate rules on exploration and development timetables for private oil
enterprises, but the relation of the Energy Act to OCSLA's provisions for regulation by
Interior was unclear. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (Supp. II 1978) (Interior to ensure
"prompt and efficient" exploration). After conferences between the two departments, the
Energy Department elected not to act, and the Interior Department rewrote existing
regulations under its OCSLA authority in lieu of any rulemaking by the Energy Depart-
ment. Interview with Teresa Hooks, former staff attorney, Office of the Solicitor, United
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frustrated, however, if an external challenger persuades a reviewing
court that the administrators erred in their choice of a "lead" agency.
The risks of such errors seem particularly daunting since a decision
against the "lead" agency would completely abrogate its rulings.31
Although much of the record built in the "lead" agency's attempts
to make rules might be useful to another agency,3 2 current rulemak-
ing practices would make a significant time saving in the second agen-
cy's rule promulgation unlikely.33 Thus, even if agencies choose to
cooperate, uncertainties about regulatory jurisdiction involve irre-
ducible risks of delay.3 4
II. The Litigation Alternative
Within the current system, the delays and uncertainties that often
result from pursuit of executive branch unanimity are largely beyond
States Department of the Interior, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 5, 1980). Officials at the
Interior Department are unable to predict whether private parties will challenge the
inter-agency decision to allot jurisdiction to Interior. Id.
31. Reversal on fundamental jurisdictional grounds leaves little room for implementa-
tion of judicial policies favoring selective reversal of administrative actions. For a recent
example of selective reversal, see Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1093 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (preliminary opinion per curiam) (upholding portions of massive EPA regula-
tion of stationary-source emissions, court rejected other portions of Agency regulations,
based upon Agency interpretation of Clean Air Act Amendments "contrary to discernible
legislative intent").
32. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1263 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (noting opportunity of Commission to use "evidence incorporated by reference from
other proceedings" in reviewable rulemaking).
33. Notwithstanding continuous debate about appropriate procedural requirements for
different agency functions, compliance with even the minimum procedural expectations
for typical notice-and-comment rulemaking requires agencies to give interested parties a
reasonable opportunity to participate in the administrative deliberations. See Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1263 n.93 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (though Com-
mission might use evidence from other proceedings, adequate new opportunity for notice
of and comment upon the evidence must be preserved); S. BREYER &- R. STEWART, An-
NfNIsrRATIvE LAw AND REGULATORY PoLicY 478-81 (1979) (requirements of Administrative
Procedure Act); J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUcTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 322-23 (1975) (provisions in "model" rulemaking structure of
Consumer Product Safety Act). Whether an agency could "apply" participation by private
parties in a prior abortive proceeding before another agency to its own deliberations, per-
haps by incorporation of the "record" in the prior proceeding, is unclear, and in respect
to some agency functions, unlikely without cooperation of the private parties. Cf. 42
U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (Supp. II 1978) (Clean Air Act Amendments requiring EPA to re-
consider a rule if party raises objection of "central relevance," if circumstances had made
it impractical for party to raise the objection earlier).
34. Assuming that the administrators have agreed not to fight among themselves, the
current approach to jurisdictional uncertainties can be mischievous in a more subtle way.
Private parties could pressure the "lead" agency to favor their interests by agreeing not
to sue the agency on jurisdictional grounds. The agency head would then face the pos-
sibility of a sweeping denial of the lawfulness of his rule, combined with frustration of
his jurisdictional compromise with the agency that deferred to his own, unless he was
prepared to satisfy the interests of the potential external challenger.
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the control of the administrators. Disputes that turn upon confusing
statutory language could be resolved more effectively if inter-agency
litigation were available to the officers with primary responsibility
for execution of the legislative design.
A. The Nature of the Action
A serious uncertainty about statutory powers and duties that leads
to an intra-branch dispute amounts-adopting a private-law metaphor
-to a cloud upon the affected agencies' title to regulate. When such
a conflict arises, an agency head should be permitted to commence
a public law version of an action to quiet title: 35 he would sue his
executive-branch rival to clear his agency's authority to regulate the
disputed subject-matter.36 This capacity to seek a declaratory judg-
ment37 would preserve the relationship between the Justice Depart-
ment and the agencies. The Justice Department would retain its du-
ties of representation in traditional external challenges to executive
actions, and it would continue to arbitrate legal issues that agencies
choose not to litigate.
When an administrator decides to litigate rather than to seek in-
ternal resolution of a jurisdictional contest, the nature of the outcome
would not change: either resolution would determine the power of
one agency, as against its executive-branch rivals, to undertake the
disputed activity. The fundamental difference would be that the in-
ter-agency suit would yield an answer that the courts would not need
to re-examine after an agency had taken final action, such as promul-
35. Because a jurisdictional controversy affects the capacity of any claimant to regulate,
an agency head sued for actual or threatened encroachment upon the plaintiff administra-
tor's jurisdiction is likely to respond by counterclaim for declaratory relief against the
plaintiff.
36. The administrator's action would be limited to the jurisdictional issue, and would
not encompass all questions about the lawfulness of final agency actions that could arise
in external parties' later challenges. See p. 1606 infra (effect of court's decision on
jurisdictional dispute on scope of later judicial review proceedings). The pleadings in the
action would present the agencies' difference on the matter of statutory construction that
gave rise to the dispute, the pertinent allegations that the plaintiff's efforts to fulfill
statutory duties were frustrated by the conflict, and a prayer for declaratory relief on the
jurisdictional question.
37. It is unclear whether federal jurisdiction to hear an administrator's complaint
could, apart from questions about its Article III justiciability, see pp. 1608-22 infra, rest
upon existing jurisdictional statutes. Assuming, however, that current provisions for federal
jurisdiction were inadequate, Congress could cure the statutory defect by legislation. Even
if amendments to the jurisdictional statutes were not essential to confer jurisdiction on
the courts, Congress might wish to address basic procedural questions through legislation.
Congress might, for example, determine by statute which officials within the agencies
should be deemed proper to commence the litigation.
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gating a rule.38 In practice, an administrator's complaint presenting
the jurisdictional issue could come long before the controversy would
reach the courts by way of the traditional two-step process. 3 9
B. Systemic Advantages of Litigation
The question of whether to litigate or to use other settlement
mechanisms should rest in each case with the dispute's principals.
Assuming federal courts would subject each complaint to traditional
jurisdictional requirements, 40 the public interest in maintaining ef-
ficient systems for resolving inter-agency disputes will not be jeopar-
dized by permitting administrators to decide whether to litigate. 41
The practical advantages of inter-agency litigation are presented here
in order to outline the general role litigation could play in an ad-
ministrator's dispute settlement strategy.
1. Avoidance of Uncertainty and Delay
Uncertainty about regulatory jurisdiction imposes hardships on the
agencies, 42 and authoritative judgments fixing the scope of adminis-
38. Full participation in the administrator's action by private parties interested in the
dispute is essential if inter-agency litigation is to meet the goals of efficiency and pro-
cedural regularity. Liberal intervention rules for external parties, combined with appro-
priate issue-preclusive effects attached to the inter-agency lawsuit, would bring nonfederal
parties into the litigation and ensure that the decision would be authoritative. Prudent
application of issue-preclusion rules would not, however, prevent flexible judicial response
to new jurisdictional disputes that could not be foreclosed in the first action. Cf. National
Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 703-04 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(reasonable res judicata effects can coexist with courts' need to restrict rulings on regula-
tory jurisdiction to broad questions without reaching separate questions of particular
application that may arise later).
39. Nothing in the proposed form of inter-agency litigation developed by this Note,
nor in the jurisdictional considerations it addresses, see pp. 1608-22 infra, would make it
impossible for an administrator to seek a final judicial answer to an intra-branch dispute
after the Justice Department had decided the issue in favor of his agency's rivals. But
since the principal advantages of inter-agency litigation derive from early resolution of
the conflict, before the Justice Department would have acted, most inter-agency lawsuits
would seek court action prior to, and in lieu of, Justice Department arbitration.
40. See pp. 1608-22 infra.
41. The view of the public interest offered by the principals to an inter-agency dispute
might be skewed by the agencies' special concerns. The court should consider such dis-
tortions in ruling on motions to dismiss or to stay proceedings. If the Justice Department
were allowed to appear in the matter, another view of the public interest, perhaps re-
flecting that of the President, could be considered by the court. It must be assumed, how-
ever, that the judgment of the principals about their agencies' need for adjudication is
entitled to great deference in entertaining such motions.
42. The hardships imposed on agencies by uncertainties and delays are assessed in
Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69
MICH. L. Rav. 1445, 1508-10 (1971).
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trative powers would spare the protagonists wasting their energies. 43
Courts have long recognized that anticipatory actions determining the
lawfulness of administrative activities assist not only the private com-
plainants but the regulators as well. 4 4 In fact, the public interest in
early resolution of an inter-agency jurisdictional conflict is even higher
than in external challenges to one agency's attempt to assert regula-
tory power. The external challenger's review proceeding assists a de-
fendant agency by clarifying limits on its jurisdiction. 45 The de-
claratory judgment on an inter-agency claim could do more, because
it would free agencies found to have no statutory duties from any
need to act further.46 With a decisiveness unique to the judicial pro-
cess, 47 the decree would concentrate both authority and responsibility
in the hands of the proper officials.
By eliminating statutory ambiguities early in the regulatory process,
inter-agency litigation possesses dramatic advantages over traditional,
two-step resolution practices. A judicial decision on a fundamental
jurisdictional question would not be deferred until an external party
challenges the rulemaking activity of the agency that "won" the in-
43. Federal courts have traditionally favored anticipatory actions that will settle public
rights and duties. See Vining, supra note 42, at 1446-91 (growth of remedies associated
with Administrative Procedure Act). The classic introductory account of the utility of
declaratory judgments, stressing private-law origins, is E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JuDG-
MENTs 3-25 (2d ed. 1941).
44. See, e.g., National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d
689, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("[P]rompt judicial review will benefit the total administrative
process by resolving uncertainties .... ); Cutler v. Kennedy, 475 F. Supp. 838, 851 (D.D.C.
1979) (continuing uncertainty about agency's statutory duties would mean "both plaintiffs
and the federal defendant would suffer a hardship"); cf. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra
note 33, at 521 (agency uncertainty about statutory procedural requirements may lead to
"elaborate panoply of formal procedures that will cripple the administrative process").
45. See note 44 supra (cases recognizing agency need for end to uncertainty about
regulatory duties).
46. Like decisions in conventional anticipatory actions challenging prospective regula-
tions, the judgment would also assist the private sector by disclosing, at an early point, the
statutory and bureaucratic structures to which the courts would hold regulated enterprises
responsible. By depriving private parties of the exclusive right to commence an action
for declaratory judgment, the inter-agency litigation option would, however, confer the
benefits of certainty on the private sector without permitting external parties to bargain
their special standing for better treatment by the agencies. See note 34 supra (mischief
where regulated parties exploit uncertainties and agency fear of suit). An administrator
who could enter court to seek clarification of his powers, as against those of a rival agency,
could not be coerced by threats of an identical jurisdictional challenge from a private
party, because he could sue before a substantial commitment of regulatory resources
would heighten his interest in avoiding external jurisdictional attacks.
47. Even more "decisive" than a judicial decree would be congressional action clarifying
the jurisdictional question; but presumably Congress will not respond as readily to a
problem of statutory interpretation as would the courts, who have traditionally assumed
primary responsibility for statutory construction. See pp. 1621-22 infra (discussing rele-
vance of possible congressional action to exercise of federal-court jurisdiction).
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ternal arbitration. At present, without an inter-agency litigation op-
tion, the time lag between initial identification of the conflict within
the executive branch and final court action will depend upon the
duration of the internal arbitration, and upon the time needed to
complete some "final" administrative action that could be subjected
to traditional judicial review. 48
Because an administrator's action to secure his regulatory title would
precede the main regulatory effort, an inter-agency suit could not
dispose of all possible attacks on agency activities, and therefore could
not accelerate resolution of all final review proceedings. 49 Anticipa-
tion of jurisdictional attacks would, however, assist the courts and the
parties to later proceedings by permitting them to focus on specific
actions taken once jurisdiction has been established. 0 The prior de-
cision on jurisdiction would eliminate the possibility of reversal of
the entire regulatory undertaking. Moreover, an early decision on
the scope of an agency's powers in one case might guide the agency
in later efforts to resolve jurisdictional uncertainties in other matters,
and perhaps make resort to formal judicial or executive mechanisms
unnecessary.
2. Procedural Regularity
Although the principal advantage of inter-agency litigation lies in
avoidance of uncertainty and delay, federal court adjudication of an
intra-branch dispute would also encourage procedural regularities
that current practices do not guarantee. Some private parties who
have an interest in the outcome of a jurisdictional dispute can par-
ticipate in an intra-branch arbitration.51 Litigation, however, would
48. Even if the courts manipulated the requirement of "final" action in order to
permit earlier review of a jurisdictional dispute upon a private party's application, the
internal arbitration process would still require time. See p. 1600 supra (time consumed
in pre-arbitration maneuvers and in OLC deliberations).
49. Even if Congress sought to curtail judicial review, it could not preclude considera-
tion of the lawfulness of agency action taken against parties alleging violations of consti-
tutional rights. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49-50 (1932); cf. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Engman, 527 F.2d 1115, 1119 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911
(1976) (noting "due process right to contest the validity of a legislative or administrative
order" (emphasis in original)). See also S. BREYER & R. STEVART, supra note 33, at 916-21
(constitutional limits on preclusion of judicial review).
50. Thus, the courts might remand the matter for perfection of the administrative
"record," see, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649-50 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), for a fuller statement of the agency's rationale, see, e.g., National Nutritional
Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975),
or because, despite a statutory mandate to regulate, the particular action taken was
meritless, see, e.g., Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 569
F.2d 831, 843-44 (6th Cir. 1978).




enhance participatory fairness in two ways. Parties that lack the con-
tacts and resources needed for continual monitoring of the executive
branch could more easily obtain notice of an inter-agency action in
time to influence the outcome, perhaps by intervention5 2 In addition,
all external parties' participation would be limited and disciplined
by the formalities of reasoned argument to a court, a procedural ad-
vantage of judicial proceedings that rules on ex parte contacts in ex-
ecutive-branch deliberations can only approximate.5 3
Litigation would also benefit the terms on which the members of
the executive branch participate in settlement of a dispute. Inter-agen-
cy lawsuits would release the Justice Department from an arbitrative
function that, in situations grave enough to require resolution by
some superior or external authority, could generate tensions between
Justice and coordinate departments affecting cooperative regulatory
efforts.54 If agencies involved in legal conflicts knew they could liti-
gate particularly serious legal issues, the solution of other, non-legal
disputes might benefit: judicial resolution of legal conflicts would
leave administrators free to solve policy problems solely on their
merits. In addition, litigation would dispel the appearance of intra-
branch unanimity that can conceal from public view serious con-
fusions in Congress' regulatory programs. 55 At the same time, litiga-
tion prior to Justice Department arbitration would spare both the
52. Settlement of an inter-agency jurisdictional conflict in court would tend partially
to equalize the relative abilities of external parties to influence resolution of the dispute.
Because a court must decide the issues on the basis of representations in court after filing of
the complaint-the publicity-creating event-the advantage obtained by early warnings
of a nascent legal conflict to powerful regulated interests from sources in the agencies will
be subdued: any head start that experienced or well-provisioned private groups would
have obtained from early participation in the executive-branch discussions will play only
an indirect part in the argument in court. Cf. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1713-15 (1975) (privileged access of regulated
parties to information about agency activities noted as basic element of representational
imbalance).
53. The importance to "the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking" of avoiding ex parte
contacts by parties unduly seeking to influence official actions is well-settled. Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56-57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)
(noting that disfavor of ex parte contacts not restricted to judicial or quasi-judicial set-
tings). See also Note, Due Process and Ex Parte Contacts in Informal Rulemaking, 89 YALE
L.J. 194 (1979) (due-process basis for ex parte prohibitions and controls). Inter-agency
litigation would transfer the decisionmaking process from the less-ordered executive-branch
setting that current ex parte rules attempt to control to the federal courts.
54. The Justice Department prefers to avoid intervention in inter-agency disputes. In-
terview with Robert E. Litan, supra note 15.
55. Cf. Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and Official
Accountability, 42 LAw 8- CoNTEMp. PROB. 8, 33 (1978) (litigation against public officers
useful in generating and distributing information about externalities of government
activities).
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courts and the executive branch from the risk of institutionally em-
barrassing variances in interpretation of the statutes.rO
III. Jurisdictional Considerations
If the administrators in a legal dispute elect to pursue litigation,
the federal court to which they turn must first resolve a critical
threshold issue: is an intra-branch legal dispute justiciable?5" Con-
stitutional and prudential limits on judicial competence must control
even an administratively sound decision to carry an inter-agency con-
flict into court.5s
The innovative characteristics of intra-branch lawsuits should shape
the inquiry into justiciability. Inter-agency claims involve uncon-
ventional party structures and timing, and the litigation occurs in
an unusual institutional setting. None of those distinctive features
would, however, violate current norms of justiciability associated with
Article III. 59
56. Federal courts are sensitive to the risk that variant positions on legal questions
will raise a problem of separation of powers within the national government. See Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (courts to avoid "the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question"); pp. 1620-21
infra (political question).
57. It has been suggested that, should Article III prohibit inter-agency litigation,
different tribunals not restricted to Article III standards for jurisdiction might hear intra-
branch legal disputes. Note, Judicial Resolution of Administrative Disputes Between
Federal Agencies, 62 HARV. L. Rav. 1050, 1056 (1949) (proposing vesting of jurisdiction in
District of Columbia courts). But even if suitable courts not bound to Article III could
be identified, any review of their decisions in an enforcement action would have to occur
in an Article III court. See note 49 supra (requirement of judicial review by Article III
tribunal). Thus, the delays and uncertainties that afflict the current method of intra-
branch dispute resolution, see p. 1600 supra, would persist; the matter could not be
settled until the Article III court had decided the issues.
58. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-93 (1974) (conflict, deemed "intra.
branch dispute" by President's counsel, justiciable if court competent to decide the issues
and grant order).
59. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority....")
In formulating the requirements of justiciability, some courts have seen a difference
between the "constitutional" and "prudential" elements of the doctrine. According to
the distinction, Congress could cure through legislation what might otherwise be a
"prudential" defect in a case's justiciability, but it could not render a controversy failing
to meet Article III requirements justiciable. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-501
(1975) (distinguishing "minimum constitutional mandate" from "matters of judicial self-
governance"); Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated on
suggestion of mootness, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (Congress may authorize suits by "private At-
torney Generals" if "actual controversy" exists). This Note considers both "pruden-
tial" and "constitutional" norms together to demonstrate the permissibility of inter-
agency suits in both of the Warth dimensions, and so the often subtle specific classifica-




The party structure of an inter-agency suit would differ from other
forms of government litigation in that the plaintiff agency would sue
for itself, without clearance or assistance from the Justice Department.
The first question is thus whether such a plaintiff has standing to sue.
The status of both litigants as members of the executive branch pre-
sents a second issue of justiciability, sometimes considered a require-
ment of "adverse parties."
1. Standing
All civil plaintiffs face two standing doctrine requirements in public
actions. A plaintiff must demonstrate sufficient interest-often called
"personal stake" 60-in the outcome of the suit to ensure that he will
assert his claims with the thoroughness and responsibility essential to
the adversary nature of an Article III "case." 61 The plaintiff must
also allege some actual or threatened "harm" or "injury" that ren-
ders judicial action appropriate. 62 Limits on the type of harm or in-
conclusion that such lawsuits would violate neither set of norms. Enactment of new
jurisdictional provisions by Congress to structure inter-agency suits might, however, be
advisable in establishing procedures for the litigation. See note 37 supra (suggesting
legislation to designate agency officials entitled to commence suit on agency's behalf.
60. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 72 (1978) (plaintiff must "have 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends. ... ) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186,
204 (1962)).
61. The function of the "interest" test for standing is thus to test the litigative capa-
bilities of the complainant. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 172-73 (Brennan, J.) (1970) (parties must "frame the relevant questions
with specificity, contest the issues with the necessary adverseness, and pursue the litigation
vigorously"). The interest test's function is highlighted by cases in which plaintiffs have
been allowed to raise claims vindicating legal rights of other parties that the plaintiffs
themselves do not possess. If the plaintiff's own stake ensures adequate representation
of the claims others might have, he may represent those claims as a surrogate. Association
of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1966); FCC
v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 518-19 (1925); Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1730-
1735 (1975) (analyzing surrogate standing doctrine); cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398-
400 (1975) (since representation adequate and issues otherwise impossible to litigate, class
action should not be dismissed despite mootness of named plaintiff's claims).
62. Prevailing formulations of the "harm" requirement are sometimes sub-divided into
three elements. A plaintiff must show (1) some actual or threatened injury, Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975), also termed "injury in fact," Association of Data Pro-
cessing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-54 (1970) (cited in Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499); (2) that the injury resulted from the defendant's conduct, Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973); and (3) that the injury is capable of redress
by a favorable decision, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 262 (1977). See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204-07 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(summarizing harm criteria applicable to all litigants). See also note 77 infra (discussing
functions of harm criteria).
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jury the courts will recognize acknowledge that judicial remedies can-
not correct any generalized public "wrong" a plaintiff might allege. 63
The Agency's "Interest" in the Outcome. The interest of an ex-
ecutive-branch agency that sues another federal authority in a ju-
risdictional dispute stems from the asserted 4 congressional commit-
ment of regulatory power to the plaintiff agency. Federal courts have
held that regulatory authorities have an institutional interest in per-
forming statutory duties that is adequate to confer standing to chal-
lenge other governmental activities that are prejudicial to fulfillment
of the statutory mandate.65 As early as 1939, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the "legitimate interest" 66 of federal agencies in preserving the
integrity of the statutes they administered, and concluded that such
an interest gave the agencies a capacity to litigate their claims without
Justice Department support. 7
In light of the function of the "interest" test for standing, the
63. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). The limits of judicially cognizable
harm were tested in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974) (gen-
eralized grievances about government operations nonjusticiable), and Schlesinger v. Re-
servists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-23 (1974) (nonspecific claims of injury
not susceptible to judicial solution).
64. Courts examining the justiciability of claims do not question the merits of plain-
tiffs' legal theories, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975), nor gainsay the complaint's
allegations of fact, id. at 501; accord, Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1980).
65. The leading lower court decision is Washington Util. 9- Transp. Comm'n v. FCC,
513 F.2d 1142, 1146-53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975). There, the Washington
state utilities commission alleged that an FCC decision impermissibly interfered with the
state agency's performance of the regulatory duties assigned to it by the state legislature.
The allegation that "the FCC order will affect the discharge . . . of its duty" was
adequate to confer standing. 513 F.2d at 1149; see Starbuck v. City and County of San
Francisco, 556 F.2d 450, 459 n.17 (9th Cir. 1977) (Washington Utilities rule could apply
to municipalities that also have statutory public-police obligations); Pennsylvania v.
Kleppe, 553 F.2d 668, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, Sen. Cir. J., dissenting) (Wash-
ington Utilities rule permits agency standing "to assure compliance with 'the congres-
sional will . . . by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement .... .')
(quoting Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d at 1153); cf. Nuesse
v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (interests of state banking authority, distinct
from those of private challengers of decision by U.S. Comptroller of the Currency,
permitted intervention).
66. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441-442 (1939) (dictum).
67. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) the Court, in holding that state legislators
had standing to seek review of a state-court decision on legislative procedure, observed,
"[Tjhere has been recognition of the legitimate interest of public officials and administra-
tive commissions, state and federal, to resist the endeavor to prevent the enforcement of
statutes in relation to which they have official duties." 307 U.S. at 441-42 (dictum)
(emphasis added). See also Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241 n.5 (1968) (state
officials have standing to challenge determination by other state authorities that would
prevent plaintiffs from performing official duties in accord with federal constitutional
requirements). Both Coleman and Allen involved appeals from state-court judgments,
but Article III jurisdictional requirements do not depend upon whether a case arises
as an original federal action or by appeal from state jurisdictions. Doremus v. Board
of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
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position adumbrated by the Supreme Court in 1939, and subsequently
adopted by the lower courts, 68 is sound. Few institutional plaintiffs
are likely to represent more thoroughly an issue of administrative
jurisdiction than an agency actually claiming the power to act; indeed,
the capacity of executive-branch agencies to litigate seems indistin-
guishable from that of the independent agencies that currently possess
unchallenged standing to oppose other federal authorities 9 It fol-
lows from the courts' recognition of an institutional interest in effec-
tive regulation that the agencies have a cognizable interest in estab-
lishing clear regulatory title. A firm jurisdictional basis is indis-
pensable to successful administration of a congressional regulatory
program.70
The "Harm" the Remedy Would Address. Satisfaction of the "harm"
criteria for standing, closely linked to the requirement of an "in-
terest" in the suit's outcome,71 begins with a showing of "injury in
68. See note 65 suPra (recent applications of agency standing analysis in Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1939)).
69. See note 4 suPra (standing of independent agencies to sue). To support its general
conclusion about agency standing, the Supreme Court in Coleman v. Miller noted instances
in which the independent agencies had litigated without support of the Justice Depart-
ment. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 442 (1939).
The litigative capacities of the executive-branch agencies also seem indistinguishable, on
a functional level, from those of state officers and agencies who in many jurisdictions are
permitted to sue one another for declaratory judgments. See, e.g., Attorney General v.
Department of Pub. Util., 342 Mass. 662, 665, 175 N.E.2d 255, 257 (1961). See also Develop-
ments in the Law-Declaratory judgments, 1941-1949, 62 HARV. L. REv. 787, 875-76 (1949)
(collecting similar cases from various state jurisdictions).
70. Other participants in national government have recognized institutional interests
in performance of constitutional and statutory functions adequate to confer standing in
Article III courts. Both houses of Congress and its committees have standinj to seek civil
remedies in aid of their investigatory powers. United States v. American Tel. 8: Tel. Co.,
551 F.2d 384, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C.
Cir. 1974). Congressmen have standing to sue the President and other officials to prevent
nullification of some exercises of their power to vote, Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430,
433 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (standing to challenge constitutionality of pocket veto), and arguably
to vindicate their legislative right to be consulted on treaty termination, Goldwater v.
Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Court declined to find that congressional plaintiffs lacked
standing).
States, territories, and municipalities have been permitted to protect their own regulatory
interests by suing federal agencies that compromise their interests. See, e.g., Starbuck v.
City of San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450, 459 (9th Cir. 1977) (although private interest
in challenging inaction of United States Secretary of Interior did not exist, city itself
might sue to enforce federal water control law against Secretary); City of Davis v.
Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975) (city may sue United States transportation De-
partment where Department's activities adversely affect city's efforts to provide services
pursuant to state law); Government of Guam v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 329 F.2d 251,
252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967) (territory has interests in per-
formance of regulatory duties distinct from parens patriae).
71. The requirement of judicially cognizable "harm" is sometimes presented as a
restatement of the standing doctrine's requirement of a substantial interest in the out-
come of the litigation. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978). The connection is close because the opportunity for redress
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fact. '' 72 Courts have found "injury in fact" in the alleged impair-
ment of agencies' recognized interest in effective, lawful regulation. 73
Even individual members of an agency incur "injury" when other
officials interfere with their fulfillment of statutory expectations.74
Insofar as an agency plaintiff must show that its alleged injury is
also "traceable" to the defendant's conduct,75 the link is easily estab-
lished: the complaint could allege that the defendant's own attempts
to regulate placed a cloud upon the plaintiff's regulatory title.70 To
the extent that the "harm" requirement attempts to ensure that the
decree will provide an effective remedy,77 a complaint for declaratory
of some harm arguably creates an interest in obtaining a judicial remedy. Yet each re-
quirement has a distinct functional emphasis, see pp. 1609-10 supra, and some decisions on
standing are explicable only by distinguishing the two components. Compare Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736 (1972) (undoubted desire to litigate environmental claim in-
adequate to confer standing on competent private organization that alleged no palpable
harm to its members) with United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Pro-
cedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686-90 (1973) (allegation of "injury in fact" to association members
cured standing defect found in Sierra Club). See also United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 177 (1974) (genuine personal interest in outcome of suit inadequate to confer
standing if "harm" alleged amounted to generalized, political grievance); Reuss v. Balles,
584 F.2d 461, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, C.J., concurring) (plaintiff lacks standing when
does not appear that decree sought would protect injured property rights).
72. See note 62 supra (requirement of actual or threatened injury, or "injury in fact").
Some courts have associated the "injury-in-fact" requirement with a rule that injury be
done to an interest "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 14
(2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). If the "injury in fact" consists of impairment of statutory func-
tions, then its location within the statutory "zone" is self-evident. See Nash v. Califano,
613 F.2d at 17.
73. See note 65 supra (citing cases on agencies' interest in performance of statutory
duties).
74. In Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980), the court held that a federal ad-
ministrative law judge had standing to challenge attempts by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to regulate the plaintiff's performance in ways that the plaintiff
claimed would improperly influence administrative adjudication, in violation of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment. Because "Nash and his colleagues
allegedly receive mandatory, unlawful instructions regarding every detail of their ju-
dicial role," the court concluded that the plaintiff had shown the requisite "injury in
fact." 613 F.2d at 16.
75. See note 62 supra (requirement of causal link).
76. A showing of "substantial likelihood" that injury would not occur without the
defendant's conduct is all the "harm" test requires. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 (1978). See also Orr v. Orr, 99 S. Ct. 1102, 1108
(1979) (in Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, attenuation of causal link
between allegedly underinclusive statute and plaintiff's harm does not render case hy-
pothetical).
77. See note 62 supra (requirement that decree be efficacious). The requirement of a
causal link betwen defendants' conduct and plaintiffs' harm can be subsumed within the
expectation that a decree would remedy the harm. Unless the harm doctrine's requirement
of a causal link between the injury and the defendant's conduct is meant to satisfy, at the
threshold of the lawsuit, some normative expectation that the defendant be "guilty" of
interfering with the plaintiff's interests-a proposition that is nowhere articulated in the
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relief would also satisfy that criterion of standing. The declaratory
judgment the plaintiff seeks would dispel the cloud upon its regula-
tory title by stating, as a matter of statutory construction, that it pos-
sesses the power to act free of the defendant's interference.78
2. "Adverse Parties"
Among the earliest formulas associated with Article III analysis
was a requirement that litigants be proper "adverse parties." 79 Except
as a restatement of the rule prohibiting collusive suits, 0 the func-
tional role of the "adverse parties" formula is elusive. A conceptually
independent "adverse parties" formula has never been the basis for
dismissal of a complaint for want of Article III jurisdiction.$' One
concern about the "adverseness" of an inter-agency suit may depend
upon the propriety of directing an order to an executive-branch
agency when the President himself could have responded with a simi-
leading standing cases-then the causal-link requirement collapses into the harm criterion's
third element: it helps ensure that an order directed at the defendant's conduct will strike
at the source of the plaintiff's injury and remedy the harm. See Orr v. Orr, 99 S. Ct.
1102, 1107-08 (1979) (conflating causal-link and decree-efficacy tests in allowing standing);
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-619 (1973) (same approach taken in denying
standing). Presumably the third element exists as an independent part of the "harm" in-
quiry because more than a causal link between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury
is essential to an efficacious decree. Moreover, unless the "injury-in-fact" requirement
simply restates the expectation of some concrete "interest" in the outcome of the litiga-
tion, see note 71 supra, then it, too, serves the same purpose as the third element of the
"harm" criterion: an order cannot have any remedial effect if in fact no wrong was
suffered.
78. Among recent judicial orders directed to federal agencies, even those that have
required substantial systemic reform of administrative programs have not been deemed
too ambitious if the plaintiffs' interests would be enhanced. Note, Judicial Control of
Systemic Inadequacies in Federal Administrative Enforcement, 88 YALE L.J. 407 (1978)
(reviewing decisions granting relief against large-scale lapses in enforcement of federal
laws); see, e.g., White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908
(1978) (detailed "enforcement injunctions" directed at federal agencies proven derelict in
performance of statutory duties); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(same). Judicial orders resolving inter-agency jurisdictional conflicts appear modest by
comparison with those "enforcement injunctions."
79. South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S.
300, 301 (1892).
80. Collusive suits involve corruption of the adversarial process when the nominal op-
ponents in a suit cooperate to seek a particular outcome. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, &
E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3530 (1975). The leading early expression of
the rules against collusion in private actions is Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 255
(1850). See also United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (applying doctrine de-
veloped in common law proceedings to feigned suit challenging official action under
statutory review procedures).
81. Thus in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974), the Court met a suggestion
from the President's counsel that a controversy was nonjusticiable if it involved "a 'juris-
dictional' dispute within the Executive Branch" with the observation, "The mere assertion
of a claim of an 'intra-branch dispute,' without more, has never operated to defeat
federal jurisdiction; justiciability does not depend on such a surface inquiry."
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lar order. Such a problem ought, however, to be considered in its
modern analytic setting as a question relating to the separation of
powers doctrine, rather than as one stemming from the litigants' party
structure.8s2
Collusion, the problem that a functionally legitimate "adverse par-
ties" formula might address, is not inherent in the party structure of
inter-agency litigation. 3 A merely speculative possibility that collu-
82. See pp. 1619-22 infra (questions arising from specialized functions of President
and the courts).
The absence of independent functional significance for the "adverse parties" category,
except as a formula implicating collusion, is reflected in the argument in a recent memo-
randum by OLC on the justiciability of a legal issue concerning the Postal Service's tax
liability to the Treasury. OLC confronted a dispute between the Postal Service and the
Treasury Department concerning the Postal Service's tax liability for line-haul and
handling charges it paid to private transporters. See OLC 77-22, supra note I. Without
suggesting that adjudication of the dispute between the Postal Service and the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) involved a risk of collusion that could deprive the courts of juris-
diction, the memorandum concluded that Article III courts could not hear the dispute
between the Postal Service and IRS in any form, apparently because both disputants were
agencies of the national government. The memorandum conceded that the Postal Service,
like the ICC in United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949), was an independent agency.
OLC 77-22, supra note 1, at 83. The memorandum also noted, however, that in the ICC
case private railroad companies interested in the suit's outcome were "active parties in the
agency and judicial proceedings, vigorously defending their private interests." Id. at
83-84. No similar adverse interests that a court could recognize seemed to OLC to be
present in the IRS dispute: "[t]he interests represented by both the Postal Service and
the IRS are facets of the public interest, not truly private interests adverse to those of
the Federal Government as a whole." Id.
The memorandum's analysis seems inadequate. In the ICC case, the participation of the
railroad intervenors was not critical to the suit. It would have been unsound for the
court to have grounded its jurisdiction on the non-mandatory presence of private inter-
venors in the litigation; at the least, the court might have been expected to wait until
the railroads commenced actions against the War Department to enforce the tariffs award-
ed to them by the ICC. The memorandum's analysis is similarly uninformed by recent
developments on the justiciability of agency "interests" that conflict with other govern-
mental activity. The memorandum nowhere explains what OLC deemed the "facets of
the public interest" it attributed to the IRS and the Postal Service, nor does it define the
"interests ... of the Federal Government as a whole." Id.; see pp. 1609-13 supra (standing
doctrine). The integrity of OLC's argument thus depends upon a narrow reading, limited
to the case's facts, that deprives it of doctrinal significance-i.e., that Postal Seriice tax
liability is not litigable-or must depend upon a talismanic belief that having two dis-
putants within the national government makes a conflict between them, lacking in-
tervenors, non-justiciable because the conflict does not involve adverse interests or private
parties. But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("mere assertion" of intra-
branch structure of lawsuit inadequate to defeat jurisdiction).
83. It is noteworthy that the federal courts have traditionally tolerated actions in
which a risk of collusion existed; indeed, such a risk will alwais exist, given the incentives
for obtaining authoritative judicial decisions to establish order in private relations or settle
public rights. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 392 U.S.
206 (1968) (with government aligning itself with petitioner in challenge to decision below,
and Court appointed amicus curiae arguing to affirm, decision obtained on the merits of
the claim). As in the party structure of Cheng Fan Kwok, where the risk of collusion,
being express on the appeal, far exceeded that in the inter-agency suits proposed here,
other parties to the intra-branch suit, for example, private intervenors, will help ensure




sion may occur cannot defeat jurisdiction:8 4 should a court later dis-
cern collusion in the conduct of the litigation, dismissal of the action
would be appropriates 5 Because they have chosen to seek judicial reso-
lution of their conflict, the adversaries in an inter-agency suit would
be entitled to the presumption of the good-faith antagonism that makes
any lawsuit workable.8 6
Any fear that the President himself would attempt to control the
administrators' lawsuit reflects an incomplete view of such litigation
and of the role of the court.87 Intervention by external parties would
ensure that the argument of the jurisdictional dispute would remain
vigorous and independent."" The plenary power of the court to dis-
miss actions that appear to have been distorted by the Chief Execu-
tive beyond hope of correction would also frustrate an attempt at
84. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974) (although "theoretically pos-
sible" for one party to assume control of litigation, case remains justiciable unless such
event occurs).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) (judgment vacated on appeal
upon showing of collusion).
86. Adverse publicity that would attend any dismissal of an inter-agency complaint for
collusion would help deter administrators from non-adversarial conduct of their litigation.
News of a suit's dismissal due to collusion would also draw congressional attention to the
underlying jurisdictional conflict within the executive branch, if one truly existed, and
thus speed resolution of the dispute by legislation resolving the agencies' interpretive
conflict. See also note 89 inIra (similar analysis of consequences of dismissal due to
presidential interference).
87. An inter-agency suit has three stages at which the President might attempt to con-
trol it. The first involves the administrator's decision whether to commence the action;
the second consists of the post-filing preparation of the case and all other phases of litiga-
tion prior to judgment; and the third is implementation of the court's final decision.
Only the second phase involves matters that the classic doctrine of collusion addresses.
Problems relating to the implementation phase are properly considered as issues of
"finality." See pp. 1621-22 infra.
Many of the institutional deterrents that would impede presidential efforts to dominate
the decision to litigate resemble the deterrents to collusion once a suit has begun. Just as
external parties' participation in an intra-branch lawsuit would help preserve the in-
tegrity of the argument in court, so the influence and support of Congress, its committees,
lobbying groups, the press, and state and local governments would complicate any signif-
icant assertion of presidential control over an administrator's strategy for settlement or
litigation prior to the filing of a complaint. Cf. Note, supra note 2, at 562-63 (1980)
(describing political forces shaping regulatory activities of the executive branch). At any
stage, only by actually terminating a willfully independent administrator could the
President decisively overcome the normal constraints on his power. Termination, how-
ever, would-like dismissal of a complaint in an action's second phase-draw public at-
tention to the underlying jurisdictional dispute and invite congressional reaction. It is
more likely that the President would favor the filing of an inter-agency complaint: the
loss in the appearance of executive-branch unanimity-already violated if an intra-branch
dispute is serious enough to draw public notice-would be outweighed by the image, and
reality, of efficient resolution of inter-agency conflicts.
88. Cf. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 431 (1976) (though original
plaintiffs had lost interest in outcome of suit, presence of United States, as statutory in-
tervenor pursuant to Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (1976), forestalled mootness
and permitted adjudication on merits).
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interposition, because it would make undue presidential involve-
ment fruitless. s9 The appropriate method of presidential involvement
in the lawsuit is participation on his behalf by the Justice Depart-
ment.90 In practice, it is more likely that the Chief Executive would
welcome litigation rather than resist it: an inter-agency lawsuit would
authoritatively resolve a conflict among his officers that was impeding
administrative efficiency 91 and that would probably reach the courts
anyway.92
B. The Timing of the Litigation
One important innovation and advantage of inter-agency litigation
lies in the opportunity it could provide for bringing the statutory
dispute to court prior to the formulation of the internal, executive-
branch position. That difference in timing would, however, require
the courts to determine whether the questions involved in the dis-
pute among the agencies are ripe for judicial resolution without at-
tainment of intra-branch unanimity. The ripeness doctrine embodies
both an Article III requirement for a "case" and other, prudential
constraints on the exercise of federal judicial power. 93
1. The Article III Ripeness Requirement
In its constitutional dimension, the ripeness requirement prevents
a court from adjudicating a dispute whose issues are too vague for
judicial analysis or resolution. Anticipatory actions that have failed
89. Dismissal of a complaint owing to the President's exertion of the powers of a
dominus litus would undoubtedly draw public attention and stimulate congressional
reaction, perhaps in the form of a resumption of interest in the problems the executive-
branch disputants sought to regulate. If Congress were moved to clarify the uncertainty
about its intention that accounted for the underlying intra-branch conflict, the court's
action in dismissing the complaint would have accomplished the final goal of the inter-
agency suit, resolution of the jurisdictional dispute.
90. See note 41 supra (briefing by Justice Department on President's behalf in inter-
agency suit).
91. See pp. 1600-02, 1604-08 supra (costs of non-judicial resolution of disputes; benefits
of litigation).
92. See pp. 1598-1600 & note 49 supra (inevitability of judicial review).
93. Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974) ("questions of
ripeness" said to involve "the exercise of judicial restraint" for reasons distinct from
Article III ripeness considerations).
94. The ripeness doctrine's function in protecting the courts from conflicts whose issues
are too inchoate for conventional legal analysis is evident in cases involving anticipatory
challenges to official action. Compare United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
89-90 (1947) (controversy not ripe, where Court could not assess lawfulness of future of-
ficial action pursuant to an unfamiliar statutory scheme in Hatch Act) with United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (twenty-five
years after United Public Workers, Court able to consider similar challenge to official
action under the original legislation). See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H.
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for lack of ripeness typically have involved uncertainties about the
principals' future activities: prospective official activity that is too
contingent to have ascertainable legal consequences cannot give rise
to an Article III "case." 95
The issues for decision in the inter-agency lawsuit, however, in-
volve no such contingencies. When claimants to regulatory jurisdic-
tion enter court armed with conflicting interpretations of the rele-
vant statutes, the issue is "pure" in that it requires declaration of
legislative intent but no assessment of the legal effect of the parties'
past or contingent conduct.96 The action cannot fail for lack of con-
creteness or specificity in the statutes and other instruments; confu-
sion about the instruments' meaning is, after all, the essence of the
conflict. The novelty of a complex statutory scheme, or a lack of
judicial experience with its functioning, does not make its construc-
tion premature.97 Nor is the dispute hypothetical, according to cur-
VECHSLER, HART AND NVECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed.)
[hereinafter cited as HART & VECHSLER] 32 (Supp. 1977) (suggesting that lapse of time
and gain in "substantial experience" with challenged legislation help explain change in
ripeness of attack on Hatch Act from time of United Public Workers to Letter Carriers).
See also Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517, 531-32 (1966) (court's appraisal of ripeness said to depend upon its assess-
ment of need for factual development in light of legal issues action raises; the more
generalized the questions, the less the need for detailed factual development).
95. See note 94 supra (cases challenging criminal statutes); cf. Nash v. Califano, 613
F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1980) (distinguishing cases "contesting the validity of a penal statute
or the policies of a prosecuting authority when [the plaintiff] is neither prosecuted nor
threatened with prosecution" from complaint alleging impairment of official functions
by other federal activities; sub silentio holding the latter ripe for declaratory judgment).
96. Thus inter-agency jurisdictional disputes, because they turn upon broad problems
of statutory construction, put the courts to tasks similar to that in Blanchette v. Connecti-
cut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102 (1974). The Court adjudged the portions of the
Blanchette case that did not depend upon a then unperformed calculation of share
values, but instead involved only application of constitutional standards to the statutory
framework Congress had established, to be ripe for adjudication. Similarly, the court in
National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
held ripe a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Labor Department to issue certain wage
guidelines prior to Departmental promulgation of a wage schedule. After noting the
ripeness doctrine's function in ensuring that courts did not "entangl[e] themselves in
abstract disagreements over administrative policies," id. at 695 (citing Abbott Laboratories,
Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)), the court concluded:
There is no problem of identifying or refining pertinent facts insofar as the court
is called upon to consider the validity of the Administrator's interpretation [of his
jurisdiction to regulate plaintiffs]. There is no "record" to be studied or made, for
the only record involved on this issue is that established by such materials as the
law and its legislative history.
Id. As in Blanchette and National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council, the gen-
erality of the issues in inter-agency lawsuits vests them with an early maturity.
97. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976) (per curiam) (displaying will-
ingness to construe novel statute); Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S.
102, 142 (1974) (same).
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rent standards for ripeness; the agencies' pleadings amount to af-
fidavits stating the disputants' good-faith intentions to attempt to
regulate the controverted subject-matter.98
2. "Prudential" Ripeness
Distinct from the Article III ripeness requirement is the policy
urging delay in adjudication when postponement would serve the
interests of the public and the litigants. 99 The prudential ripeness
doctrine requires a balancing analysis that almost always will favor
adjudication of the administrator's complaint. The question is wheth-
er the public interest in efficient use of judicial energies will out-
weigh the distinct administrative interest in early resolution of a
serious intra-branch jurisdictional dispute.100
In many cases, the court's alternative to inter-agency litigation
will be to wait until the Justice Department has thrown its weight
behind one of the executive-branch disputants and an external chal-
lenge has arisen.' 0 ' Awaiting an external challenge is unlikely to
spare the court exertions sufficient to outweigh the public interest
in resolution of a legal dispute that has paralyzed implementation
of congressional regulation. If the confusion is grave enough to have
produced a clash among the federal agencies, it is unlikely that pri-
vate challengers will omit the issue of regulatory jurisdiction from
their attack on the executive branch's ultimate administrative ac-
tion.102 Thus, rarely would the courts be able to avoid addressing
98. Cf. National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 701
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (absent affidavit to rebut it, a presumption of finality attached to agency
head's assertion of regulatory jurisdiction).
99. Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974); Landis v. North
Am. Ins. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 256 (1936); cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81-82 (1978) (presupposing analytically distinct constitutional
and prudential ripeness requirements).
100. See pp. 1604-08 supra (public interest in inter-agency lawsuits).
101. Insofar as the prudential doctrine aims at conservation of judicial resources, the
court should decide the case if delay would place it "in no better position later ... to
confront the validity of [a controverted statute's] provisions." Blanchette v. Connecticut
Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 145 (1974); see Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v.
Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (if later attempts to assert the disputed
power are certain to produce litigation and resolution of legal issues does not require
case-by-case factual development, "prompt resolution will eliminate uncertainty and be in
the interest of efficient judicial administration"). But cf. Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of
Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297,
315 (1979) (courts should avoid adjudication that would "encroach on the prerogatives of
later courts.")
102. The tradition of non-deferential judicial treatment of Justice Department advice
resolving intra-branch disputes, see note 26 supra (judicial decisions rejecting Justice De-
partment opinions), would demonstrate to private parties that even if the Justice Depart-
ment's arbitration had an outcome adverse to their interests, an attack on the internal
settlement would stand some chance of rewarding the effort of litigation.
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the jurisdictional issue in inter-agency litigation through dismissal on
ripeness grounds.
Some judicial effort might be saved if a delay would clarify the
issues for later resolution in an external party's challenge. But in a
lawsuit seeking reconciliation of ambiguous or conflicting statutory
mandates, a dispute that meets the Article III ripeness test for con-
creteness is unlikely to attain more clarity through delay. Precisely
because the statutes are difficult to interpret, the agencies cannot
spend further time and public money on regulation without first
entrusting their conflicting claims either to Justice Department ar-
bitration or to the federal courts. 03 Some sector of the national gov-
ernment must respond to the jurisdictional uncertainty by interpret-
ing the statutes. The interpretive effort that the courts are "saved,"
if they defer to the arbitration process, would be expended instead
by the Attorney General. Moreover, agency reliance on the Justice
Department's advice would incur substantial risks of ultimate re-
versal in the courts. 0 4 For a court to assume the burden of adjudi-
cating a justiciable dispute would, however, spare the Justice Depart-
ment the same interpretive task and avert the needless risks and
delays of arbitration.10
C. The Institutional Setting of the Litigation
By consolidating the initial intra-branch dispute with the external
parties' challenge, adjudication of an inter-agency legal conflict would
require judicial performance of tasks frequently undertaken by the
President and his law officers. Such an adjustment raises another
question concerning justiciability: would judicial resolution of the
dispute violate the constitutionally established pattern of institution-
al specialization among the three branches?
1. The Substantive Justiciability of the Issues-Political Questions
A recognized category of non-justiciable disputes are those for
which "judicially discoverable and manageable standards"'10 are lack-
ing. Implicit in many decisions declining jurisdiction'01 is a belief
103. Though the federal agencies must routinely commit resources, with or without
express Justice Department advice, even though they lack any assurance of ultimate af-
firmance by the courts, the risks of error on a jurisdictional question are unique. See
pp. 1601-02 sukra (risks of agency action on questionable statutory basis).
104. See note 26 supra (significant chance of reversal of Justice Department's position).
105. See p. 1600 supra.
106. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
107. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533, 533-36 (1979) (Powell, J.) (labelling
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that courts are ill-equipped to solve social and political problems. 108
Inter-agency legal disputes concerning regulatory jurisdiction do not,
however, test the limit of judicial competence. The traditional model
for resolution of intra-branch disputes itself assigns the jurisdictional
dispute to the courts when an external party challenges the admin-
istrative activity. 109
2. Separation of Powers
The federal courts are expected to enforce specific statutory com-
mitments of regulatory power when reviewing the lawfulness of agen-
cy action.110 Under the current two-step system, the constitutionally
required inquiry into regulatory jurisdiction will occur after the
President has spoken through the internal arbitration process; the
doctrine of separation of powers does not permit the courts to avoid
adjudication simply because the President has spoken."'
To suggest that the separation of powers doctrine requires judicial
inaction before the President has acted but not after he has done so
-that is, to see a difference between inter-agency litigation and later
judicial review proceedings-imputes an empty temporal significance
as "not ripe," but otherwise justiciable, complaint deemed by other Justices to be non-
justiciable political question); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 520 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (attributing majority's decision to dismiss complaint for lack of standing to
case's "grave sociological and political ramifications").
108. Whether a case involves a political question is "essentially a function of the
separation of powers." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see, e.g., Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding challenge to conduct of
foreign policy presented "political question"); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d
Cir. 1971) (dismissing as political question claim concerning warmaking power).
109. See p. 1600 supra (continuity of jurisdictional issues in two-step model). It is
noteworthy that in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the Court found the Special
Prosecutor's claims to be "'of a type which are traditionally justiciable.' " Id. at 697
(quoting United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949) (suit by War Department against
Commission)). The Court had previously noted, without approving or disapproving, a
characterization of the issues by the President's counsel "as essentially a 'jurisdictional'
dispute ... in determining what evidence is to be used in a given criminal case." Id. at
693. Evidently the Court did not think that whatever "jurisdictional" quality the issues
possessed deprived them of their "traditionally justiciable" character.
110. See National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689,
695 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ('In our overall pattern of government the judicial branch has the
function of requiring the executive (or administrative) branch to stay within the limits
prescribed by the legislative branch."); cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974)
(although constitutional views of President are entitled to deference, "fm]any decisions
of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed ... that '[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.") (quoting Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549
(1969) (judicial task extends to interpretation of Constitution even at variance with
congressional position).
111. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 697 (1974) (deciding merits of presidential
interpretation of "the applicable law and regulation").
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to the doctrine. Far from serving any institutional purpose, such an
approach actually would prejudice an important value reflected in the
separation of powers doctrine. One reason for the courts to deal sen-
sitively with coordinate powers is to avoid "the potentiality of embar-
rassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question. 1 1 1 2 An early judicial resolution of the jurisdictional
dispute, rather than forebearance until the President has spoken,
would avoid such embarrassment.
3. Finality of Judgment
A third inter-branch limitation on federal judicial power requires
that a judicial order have "finality." 113 If, after the courts have spoken,
a coordinate political branch could act to nullify the judicial reso-
lution, any exercise of Article III power would be inappropriate: the
judicial decree would not adjust the legal positions of the litigants
but would only provide advice to the other branches as they devel-
oped their own solution to a controversy. 1 4 The finality doctrine
does not, however, permit the courts to decline jurisdiction because
of fear that the executive or legislative branches might fail to obey
their orders. 15
In an inter-agency dispute, a court would be entitled to assume that
the President will not attempt to frustrate the court's mandate by
directing the losing administrator to take jurisdiction and the victor
to defer."" Far more likely is the possibility that Congress might "re-
peal" a court's interpretation of the controverted statute through
amendment. Yet such a congressional response would not violate the
norm of judicial finality. Congress routinely adjusts its legislation in
112. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See also id. at 211 ("Deciding ... whether
action of . [another] branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed [by the
Constitution] is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsi-
bility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.")
113. The finality requirement has two inter-branch components: the institutional
setting of the judicial action must not expose the decree to "revision" by the executive
branch, see HART & WVEcHSLER, supra note 94, at 91-92, or by the Congress, id. at 98-102.
114. Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Co., 333 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1948) (refusing
to review administrative order that President could have disapproved after judicial deci-
sion affirming it).
115. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) (alleged conflict in constitu-
tional interpretation among branches cannot justify courts avoiding constitutional re-
sponsibility); accord, Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 149 n.35
(1974); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 571 (1962) (Harlan, J.); Nixon v. Sirica,
487 F.2d 700, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
116. If agencies did take action violating the court's declaratory order, private parties
might (I) obtain mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976) to enforce it, or (2) await
other agency actions that would make the unlawful assumption or deferral of regulatory
jurisdiction subject to more conventional review proceedings.
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reaction to judicial decisions. 117 Adjudication of the issues in an
inter-agency suit would thus be no less "final" than a judgment on
the same questions in the conventional context of an attack on gov-
ernment regulation by external parties.
Conclusion
Conflicts about the regulatory jurisdiction of executive-branch agen-
cies are inevitable. The legitimacy of both presidential and judicial
participation in the resolution of uncertainties about the agencies'
power is not subject to serious debate today. Yet the current approach
to settling inter-agency jurisdictional conflicts assigns the courts ul-
timate responsibility for interpretation of statutes, but requires them
to await formulation of a single executive-branch answer to the issues
they must decide. That approach can involve a paralysis of the ad-
ministrative process not required by the federal constitutional design.
Placing a limited power to litigate in the hands of the administrators
would simplify resolution of the executive branch's legal conflicts
without straining traditional limits on judicial competence.
117. A court might find it prudent to abstain from adjudication of a controversy if it
were probable that the uncertainty would be resolved by congressional amendment of the
relevant statutes. Cf. Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
997 (1978) (basing denial of standing in part upon possibility of redress of plaintiff's
grievance through amendment of challenged legislation).
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